
Shamir Secret Sharing in a Password Manager: Recovery Without a Forgot-Password Button
Why a threshold of 3 shares out of 5 can recover a vault that no single holder can open
Building a password manager with no email signup, no account, and zero-knowledge encryption. The engineering behind VaultKeepR, open source: Argon2id and XChaCha20-Poly1305 in TypeScript, Solidity contracts on Base, wallet-based identity, CRDT sync, IPFS storage, fragmented recovery, digital legacy. Working code, threat models, Foundry tests, and the trade-offs we argue about. MIT, reuse it.

Why a threshold of 3 shares out of 5 can recover a vault that no single holder can open
The vault is the easy part. Recovery, export and account requirements decide whether a move holds

The official product and the community server are not the same thing

How client-side encryption works, and three questions to check any claim
